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Abstract
Computational philosophy is the use of mechanized computa-
tional techniques to unearth philosophical insights that are either
difficult or impossible to find using traditional philosophical meth-
ods. Computational metaphysics is computational philosophy with
a focus on metaphysics. In this paper, we (a) develop results in
modal metaphysics whose discovery was computer assisted, and
(b) conclude that these results work not only to the obvious bene-
fit of philosophy but also, less obviously, to the benefit of computer
science, since the new computational techniques that led to these
results may be more broadly applicable within computer science.
The paper includes a description of our background methodology
and how it evolved, and a discussion of our new results.
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1 The Basic Computational Approach to
Higher-Order Modal Logic
The application of computational methods to philosophical problems was
initially limited to first-order theorem provers. These are easy to use and
have the virtue that they can do proof discovery. In particular, Fitelson
and Zalta1 both (a) used Prover9 to find a proof of the theorems about
situation and world theory2 and (b) found an error in a theorem about
Plato’s Forms that was left as an exercise in a paper by Pelletier & Zalta.3
And, Oppenheimer and Zalta discovered,4 using Prover9, that 1 of the 3
premises used in their reconstruction of Anselm’s ontological argument5
was sufficient to derive the conclusion. Despite these successes, it be-
came apparent that working within a first-order theorem-proving system
involved a number of technical compromises that could be solved by using
a higher-order system. For example, in order to represent modal claims,
second-order quantification, and schemata, etc., in Prover9, special tech-
niques must be adopted that force formulas which are naturally expressed
in higher-order systems into the less-expressive language of multi-sorted
first-order logic. These techniques were discussed in the papers just men-
tioned and outlined in some detail in a paper by Alama, Oppenheimer,
and Zalta.6 The representations of expressive, higher-order philosophical
claims in first-order logic is therefore not the most natural; indeed, the
complexity of the first-order representations grows as one considers philo-
sophical claims that require greater expressivity. And this makes it more
difficult to understand the proofs found by the first-order provers.
1Fitelson & Zalta, “Steps toward a computational metaphysics”.
2Zalta, “Twenty-Five Basic Theorems”.
3Pelletier & Zalta, “How to Say Goodbye to the Third Man”.
4Oppenheimer & Zalta, “Simplification of the ontological argument”.
5Oppenheimer & Zalta, “On the logic of the ontological argument”.
6Alama, Oppenheimer & Zalta, “Automating Leibniz’s theory of concepts”. For
example, to represent the T schema φ→ φ, one begins with the intermediate repre-
sentation ∀p(p→ p). Then one introduces two sortal predicates Proposition(x) and
Point(x), where the latter represent the possible worlds. In addition, a distinguished
point W must be introduced, as well as a truth predicate True(x,y). Then one can rep-
resent ∀p(p→ p) as: all x (Proposition(x) -> (all y (Point(y) -> True(x,y))
-> True(x,W))).
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1.1 The Move to Higher-Order Systems
Ways of addressing such problems were developed in a series of papers
by Benzmu¨ller and colleagues. Using higher-order theorem provers, they
brought computational techniques to the study of philosophical problems
and, in the process, they (along with others) developed two methodologies:
• Using the syntactic capabilities of a higher-order theorem prover
such as Isabelle/HOL (a) to represent the semantics of a target
logic and (b) to define the original syntax of the target theory within
the prover. We call this technique Shallow Semantic Embeddings
(SSEs).7 These SSEs suffice for the implementation of interesting
modal, higher-order, and non-classical logics and for the investiga-
tion of the validity of philosophical arguments. By proving that the
axioms or premises of the target system are true in the SSE, one
immediately has a proof of soundness of the target system.
• Developing additional abstraction layers to represent the deductive
system of philosophical theories with a reasoning system that goes
beyond the deductive systems of classical modal logics.
Early papers focused on the development of SSEs. These papers show
that the standard translation from propositional modal logic to first-order
logic can be concisely modelled (i.e., embedded) within higher-order the-
orem provers, so that the modal operator , for example, can be explic-
itly defined by the λ-term λϕ.λw.∀v.(Rwv → ϕv), where R denotes the
accessibility relation associated with . Then one can construct first-
order formulas involving ϕ and use them to represent and proof theo-
rems. Thus, in an SSE, the target logic is internally represented using
higher-order constructs in an automated reasoning environment such as
Isabelle/HOL. Benzmu¨ller and Paulson8 developed an SSE that captures
quantified extensions of modal logic (and other non-classical logics). For
example, if ∀x.φx is shorthand in functional type theory for Π(λx.φx),
then ∀xPx would be represented as Π′(λx.λw.Pxw), where Π′ stands
7This is to be contrasted with a deep semantic embedding, in which the syntax of
the target language is represented using an inductive data structure (e.g., following
the BNF of the language) and the semantics of a formula is evaluated by recursively
traversing the data structure. Shallow semantic embeddings, by contrast, define the
syntactic elements of the target logic while reusing as much of the infrastructure of the
meta-logic as possible.
8Benzmu¨ller & Paulson, “Quantified multimodal logics”.
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for the λ-term λΦ.λw.Π(λx.Φxw), and the  gets resolved as described
above.9
The SSE technique was also the starting point for a natural encoding
of Go¨del’s modern variant of the ontological argument in second-order
S5 modal logic. Various computer formalizations and assessments of re-
cent variants of the ontological argument in higher-order theorem provers
emerged in work by Benzmu¨ller and colleagues. Initial studies10 investi-
gated Go¨del’s and Scott’s variants of the argument within the higher-order
automated theorem prover (henceforth ATP) LEO-II.11 Subsequent work
deepened these assessment studies.12 Instead of using LEO-II, these stud-
ies utilized the higher-order proof assistant Isabelle/HOL,13 a system that
is interactive and supports strong proof automation. Some of these exper-
iments were reconstructed in the proof assistant Coq.14 Additional follow-
up work contributed similar studies15 and includes a range of variants of
the ontological argument proposed by other authors, such as Anderson,
9To see how these expressions can be resolved to produce the right representation,
consider the following series of reductions:
∀xPx ≡ Π′(λx.λw.Pxw)
≡ ((λΦ.λw.Π(λx.Φxw))(λx.λw.Pxw))
≡ (λw.Π(λx.(λx.λw.Pxw)xw))
≡ (λw.Π(λx.Pxw))
≡ (λϕ.λw.∀v.(Rwv → ϕv))(λw.Π(λx.Pxw))
≡ (λϕ.λw.Π(λv.Rwv → ϕv))(λw.Π(λx.Pxw))
≡ (λw.Π(λv.Rwv → (λw.Π(λx.Pxw))v))
≡ (λw.Π(λv.Rwv → Π(λx.Pxv)))
≡ (λw.∀v.Rwv → ∀x.Pxv)
≡ (λw.∀vx.Rwv → Pxv)
Thus, we end up with a representation of ∀xPx in functional type theory.
10Benzmu¨ller & Paleo, “Automating Go¨del’s ontological proof”.
11Benzmu¨ller, Sultana, Paulson & Theiß, “The higher-order prover LEO-II”.
12Benzmu¨ller & Paleo, “The inconsistency in Go¨del’s ontological argument”.
Benzmu¨ller & Paleo, “Object-logic explanation for the inconsistency in Go¨del’s on-
tological theory”.
13Nipkow, Paulson & Wenzel, “Isabelle/HOL“.
14Bertot & Casteran, “Interactive Theorem Proving and Program Development“.
Benzmu¨ller & Paleo, “Interacting with modal logics in the Coq proof assistant”.
15Benzmu¨ller, Weber & Paleo, “Analysis of the Anderson-Ha´jek controversy”. Fuen-
mayor & Benzmu¨ller, “Automating emendations of the ontological argument”. Fuen-
mayor & Benzmu¨ller, “A case study on computational hermeneutics”. Bentert,
Benzmu¨ller, Streit & Paleo, “Analysis of an ontological proof proposed by Leibniz”.
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Hajek, Fitting, and Lowe.16 Moreover ultrafilters have been used17 to
study the distinction between extensional and intensional positive prop-
erties in the variants of Scott, Anderson and Fitting. This ongoing work
will be sketched in Section 2.
The other main technique (i.e., the one in the second bullet point
above), was developed by Kirchner and Benzmu¨ller to re-implement, in
a higher-order system, the work by Fitelson and Zalta.18 In order to de-
velop a more general implementation of Abstract Object Theory (hence-
forth AOT or ‘object theory’), it doesn’t suffice to just develop an SSE
for AOT. The SSE of Go¨del’s ontological argument relies heavily on the
completeness of second-order modal logic with respect to Kripke models.
Given these completeness results, the computational analysis at the SSE
level accurately reflects what follows from the premises of the argument.
Since such completeness results aren’t available for AOT with respect to
its Aczel models, some other way of investigating the proof system com-
putationally is needed. To address this, Kirchner extended the SSE by
introducing the new concept of abstraction layers.19 By introducing an
additional proof system (as a higher abstraction layer, on top of the se-
mantic embedding) that involves just the axioms of the target logic, one
can do automated reasoning in the target logic without generating arti-
factual theorems (i.e., theorems of the model that aren’t theorems of the
target logic), and without requiring the embedding to be complete or even
provably complete. So the additional abstraction layer makes interactive
and automated reasoning in Isabelle/HOL possible in a way that is inde-
pendent of the model structure used for the semantic embedding itself.
Whereas the SSE serves as a sound basis for implementing the abstract
reasoning layer, the embedding with abstraction layers provides the in-
frastructure for a deeper analysis of the semantic properties of the target
logic, such as completeness. We’ll expand upon this theme on several
occasions below.
16Anderson, “Some emendations of Go¨del’s ontological proof”. Anderson & Get-
tings, “Go¨del’s ontological proof revisited”. Ha´jek, “Magari and others on Go¨del’s
ontological proof”. Ha´jek, “Der Mathematiker und die Frage der Existenz Gottes”.
Ha´jek, “A new small emendation of Go¨del’s ontological proof”. Fitting, “Types,
Tableaus, and Go¨del’s God”. Lowe, “A modal version of the ontological argument”.
17Benzmu¨ller & Fuenmayor, “Can computers help to sharpen our understanding of
ontological arguments?”.
18Fitelson & Zalta, “Steps toward a computational metaphysics”.
19Kirchner, “Representation and Partial Automation of the PLM in Isabelle/HOL”.
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Kirchner reconstructs not only AOT’s fundamental theorems about
possible worlds, but arrives at meta-theorems about the correspondence
between AOT’s syntactic possible worlds and the semantic possible worlds
used in its models.20 In particular, Kirchner shows, using the embedding
of AOT in Isabelle/HOL, that for each syntactic possible worldw of AOT,
there exists a semantic possible world w in the embedding, such that all
and only propositions derivably true in w (using AOT’s definition of truth
in possible worlds) are true in w, and vice-versa. The shallow semantic
embedding with abstraction layers made it possible to reason both within
the target logic itself (i.e., in the higher-level abstract reasoning layer)
and about the target logic (i.e., using the outer logic of HOL as metalogic
and the embedding as a definition of the semantics of the target logic).
To illustrate, as simply as possible, some of the technical details in-
volved in the two basic techniques described above, we now turn to the
development of an SSE for propositional modal logic, and show how an
abstraction layer can be added on top of that.
1.2 Propositional S5 with Abstraction Layers.
Our computational method can be illustrated with the simple example of
a shallow semantic embedding of a propositional S5 logic with abstraction
layers. In order to map modal logic to non-modal higher-order logic we
use Kripke semantics. To that end we introduce a (non-empty) domain i
for possible worlds in terms of a type declaration. In Isabelle/HOL:
typedecl i
Then we define a type for propositions, which are represented by func-
tions mapping possible worlds to booleans. The right-hand side of the
following in Isabelle/HOL represents the complete set of all (UNIV) func-
tions from type i to type bool. This set is used to define a new abstract
type o, whose objects are represented by elements of this set.21
typedef o = "UNIV::(i⇒bool) set" ..
20Kirchner, “Representation and Partial Automation of the PLM in Isabelle/HOL”.
21To introduce a new type the representation set has to be non-empty. The fact that
it is non-empty here can be trivially proven, which is indicated by the two dots at the
end of the line.
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Given these definitions we then lift the already defined connectives of
our meta-logic HOL to the newly introduced type o of propositions in the
target logic:
lift definition S5 not :: "o⇒ o" ("¬ " [54] 70)
is "λp. λw. ¬(p w)" .
lift definition S5 impl :: "o⇒ o⇒ o" ( infixl "→" 51)
is "λp. λq. λw. (p w) −→ (q w)" .
The first defines the new operator S5 not (with the convenient syntax
of a bold negation ¬) on the abstract type o using the given λ-function
on the representation type (functions from possible worlds to booleans).
In λp. λw. ¬(p w), the λ-bound p is a function from possible worlds to
booleans (type i⇒bool) and w is a possible world. The λ-term maps p
and w to the negation of: w applied to p. So it defines a function of
type (i⇒bool)⇒i⇒bool, which is exactly the representation type of the
desired signature o⇒ o. The implication connective S5 impl with syntax
→ is defined in a similar manner.
Using the same mechanism the unique operators of modal logic can
be defined in accordance with their Kripke semantics:
lift definition S5 box :: "o⇒ o" (" " [62] 63)
is "λp. λw. ∀v. p v" .
lift definition S5 dia :: "o⇒ o" ("♦ " [62] 63)
is "λp. λw. ∃v. p v" .
To formulate statements about our newly defined target logic, we still
have to define what it means for a formula of the target logic to be valid.
There are two options for defining validity, i.e., either as truth relative
to a designated actual world or as truth in all possible worlds. Thus, to
define validity, we first need a definition of truth relative to a possible
world:
lift definition S5 true in world :: "i⇒ o⇒bool" ("[ |= ]")
is "λp. λw. p w" .
It turns out that this is sufficient for reasoning about validity; so we
don’t need to choose between the following two alternative definitions22
of global validity:
22It has been argued that the second option is more philosophically correct, see
Zalta, “Logical and analytic truths that are not necessary”.
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lift definition S5 valid nec :: "o⇒bool" ("[ ]")
is "λp. ∀w. p w" .
consts w0 :: i
lift definition S5 valid act :: "o⇒bool" ("A[ ]")
is "λp. p w0" .
What we have so far is a shallow semantical embedding of an S5 modal
logic, implemented using an abstract type in Isabelle/HOL.23 We can al-
ready formulate and prove statements in our target logic at this stage by
initiating what Isabelle/HOL calls a transfer of a given statement to its
counterpart with respect to the representation types, in accordance with
the lifting definitions.24 So to prove the K♦-lemma, we simply give the
following command:
lemma "[w |= (p→ q)→ (♦p→ ♦q)]"
apply transfer by auto
The proof of this lemma uses the transfer method and is shown to
be valid in the semantics, so the proof doesn’t reveal which particular
axioms, or axiom system, of S5 are needed to derive it in the traditional
sense. In the case of propositional S5 modal logic this doesn’t constitute
a problem, since it is known that it is complete with respect to Kripke
semantics. So everything that is derivable from the semantics will also
be derivable from the standard axioms of S5. However, for more complex
target systems like AOT, this is not the case a priori.
We could, at this point, show how the additional abstraction layers
needed for the proof theory of AOT can be developed, but that would
introduce complexity that isn’t really needed for this discussion. So, in-
stead, we shall illustrate how an abstraction layer can be added to the
above SSE for propositional modal logic. For the remainder of this sec-
tion, then, we proceed as if the completeness results for Kripke semantics
aren’t known. For the analysis of the proof theory of propositional S5
logic, the first step is to simultaneously show that the system of proposi-
tional S5 logic is sound with respect to our semantics and construct the
23For the shallow semantical embedding alone we could have skipped the intro-
duction of a new abstract type o, but instead used the representation type i⇒bool
directly in the definitions; however, using the abstract type makes it easier to introduce
the abstraction layer in the following paragraphs.
24Huffman & Kuncar, “Lifting and transfer”.
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basis of our abstraction layer by deriving the standard S5 axioms from
the semantics:
lemma ax K: "[w |= (p→ q)→ (p→ q)]"
apply transfer by auto
lemma ax T: "[w |= p→ p]"
apply transfer by auto
lemma ax 5: "[w |= ♦p→ ♦p]"
apply transfer by auto
Furthermore we need axioms for the classical negation and implication
operators, e.g.,
lemma ax pl 1: "[w |= p→ (q→ p)]"
apply transfer by auto
and so on for the other axioms of propositional logic.
Next we need to derive the two inference rules, i.e., modus ponens and
necessitation.
lemma mp: assumes "[w |= p]" and "[w |= p→ q]"
shows "[w |= q]"
using assms apply transfer by auto
lemma necessitation: assumes "∀v. [v |= p]"
shows "[w |= p]"
using assms apply transfer by auto
Unfortunately, in our implementation we are lacking structural induc-
tion, i.e., induction on the complexity of a formula. For that reason, we
also have to derive meta-rules for our target system from the semantics,
e.g.,
lemma deduction: assumes "[w |= p] =⇒ [w |= q]"
shows "[w |= p→ q]"
using assms apply transfer by auto
Together, the axioms, the inference rules and our meta-rules now con-
stitute the abstraction layer in our embedding. Subsequent reasoning can
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be restricted so that it doesn’t use the semantic properties of the embed-
ding (i.e., so that it won’t transfer abstract types to representation types
or unfold the semantic definitions). In this way, proofs can be constructed
that only rely on the axioms and rules themselves.
Given a sane choice of inference rules and meta-rules, every theorem
derived in this manner is guaranteed to be derivable from the axiom sys-
tem. While simple propositional S5 modal logic is known to be complete
with respect to its semantic representation, one can still construct ab-
straction layers to reproduce and analyze the deductive reasoning system
of a particular formalization of S5. The abstraction layer can help a user
in interactive reasoning, since it enables the same mode of reasoning as
the target system with identical rules. More generally, whenever the focus
of an investigation is derivability rather than semantic truth,25 introduc-
ing abstraction layers is either necessary (if there are no completeness
results) or at least helpful (even if there are completeness results), since
they alleviate the need for a translation process from semantic facts to
actual derivations.
A reasonable analysis of AOT is not possible without abstraction lay-
ers. For one, AOT is more expressive than propositional modal logic and
uses foundations that are fundamentally different from HOL.26 Therefore
a representation of the semantics and a model structure of AOT in HOL
is more complex and it becomes more difficult to reason about AOT solely
by unfolding semantic definitions. Furthermore, there are as yet no results
about the completeness of the canonical Aczel models of AOT, so there is
no guarantee that theorems valid in the semantic embedding are in fact
derivable using the axioms and derivation system of AOT itself. Lastly,
although the original motivation for constructing an SSE of AOT was
mainly to investigate the feasibility of a translation between functional
and relational type theory and to gain insights about possible models of
the theory, it turned out that an SSE with abstraction layers can be used
as a means to analyze the effects of variations in the axiomatization of
AOT itself. This led to an evolution of AOT, parts of which are described
in Section 3.
25This is generally the case when investigating an entire logical theory, rather than
a logical argument that might not even specify a fixed axiom system against which it
is formulated.
26AOT is formulated in relational type theory, whereas HOL is based on functional
type theory. A translation between the two is known to be challenging, e.g. see
Oppenheimer & Zalta, “Relations Versus Functions”.
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The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we
explain how the SSE technique led to insights about Go¨del’s ontological
argument. In Section 3, we discuss the various insights into AOT that
emerged as a result of the addition of the abstraction layer to the SSE for
AOT. Finally, in Section 4, we discuss how our techniques may be general-
ized, and how cross-pollination between computer science and philosophy
works to the benefit of both disciplines.
2 Implementation of Go¨del’s Ontological
Argument
This section outlines the results of a series of experiments in which the
SSE approach was successfully utilized for the computer-supported as-
sessment of modern variants of the ontological argument for the exis-
tence of God. The first series of experiments, conducted by Benzmu¨ller
and Woltzenlogel-Paleo, focused on Go¨del’s higher-order modal logic vari-
ant,27 as emended by Dana Scott28 and others; the detailed results were
presented in the literature.29 This work had a strong influence on the
research mentioned above, since its success motivated the question of
whether the SSE approach would eventually scale for more ambitious and
larger projects in computational metaphysics. The computer-supported
assessments of Go¨del’s version of the ontological argument and its variants
revealed several novel findings some of which will be outlined below.
2.1 Inconsistency and Other Results about Go¨del’s
Argument
In the course of experiments,30 the theorem prover Leo-II detected that
the unedited version of Go¨del’s formulation of the argument31 was incon-
sistent, and that the emendation introduced by Scott32 while transcribing
27Go¨del, “Appendix A. Notes in Kurt Go¨del’s Hand”.
28Scott, “Appendix B: Notes in Dana Scott’s Hand”.
29Benzmu¨ller & Paleo, “The inconsistency in Go¨del’s ontological argument”.
Benzmu¨ller & Paleo, “Automating Go¨del’s ontological proof”. Benzmu¨ller, Weber
& Paleo, “Analysis of the Anderson-Ha´jek controversy”. Fuenmayor & Benzmu¨ller,
“Types, Tableaus and Go¨del’s God”.
30Benzmu¨ller & Paleo, “Automating Go¨del’s ontological proof”.
31Go¨del, “Appendix A. Notes in Kurt Go¨del’s Hand”.
32Scott, “Appendix B: Notes in Dana Scott’s Hand”.
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the original notes was essential to preserving consistency. The Scott ver-
sion was verified for logical soundness in the interactive proof assistants
Isabelle/HOL33 and Coq.34 In Figures 2 and 3, the axioms causing the
inconsistency in Go¨del’s manuscript are highlighted. The inconsistency,
which was missed by philosophers, is explained in detail in related publi-
cations.35
The problem Go¨del introduced in his scriptum36 is that essence is
defined as:
P2 A property Y is the essence of an individual x iff all of x’s properties
are entailed by Y , i.e., iff ∀Z(Zx→ Y ⇒Z),
where Y ⇒Z means that ∀x(Y x→ Zx). We’ll see below that this defini-
tion doesn’t require that an individual x exemplify its essence, something
we would intuitively expect of the notion of an essence. Scott, in contrast,
added a conjunct to the definition of essence:
P2′ A property Y is the essence of an individual x iff x has property Y
and all of x’s properties are entailed by Y .
This simple emendation by Scott preserved consistency of the axioms
Go¨del introduced as premises of the argument.
The inconsistency in Go¨del’s original version already appears when the
argument is formulated in the quantified modal logic K (with and without
the Barcan formulas), and thus also appears in the stronger logics KB and
S5, which are both extensions of K.37 By proving a simple lemma, one
can demonstrate how the inconsistency arises. The simple lemma is:
EmptyEssenceLemma An empty property (e.g., being non-self-
identical) is an essence of any individual x.
This lemma, in combination with the other highlighted axioms and def-
initions in Figures 2 and 3, implies a contradiction.38 The inconsistency
33Nipkow, Paulson & Wenzel, “Isabelle/HOL“.
34Bertot & Casteran, “Interactive Theorem Proving”.
35Benzmu¨ller & Paleo, “Object-logic explanation for the inconsistency in Go¨del’s
ontological theory”. Benzmu¨ller & Paleo, “The inconsistency in Go¨del’s ontological
argument”.
36Go¨del, “Appendix A. Notes in Kurt Go¨del’s Hand”.
37Though in S5, the Barcan formulas are derivable.
38Benzmu¨ller & Paleo, “Object-logic explanation for the inconsistency in Go¨del’s
ontological theory”.
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was detected automatically by the ATP Leo-II,39 and in the course of the
proof, it used the fact that an empty property obeys the above lemma to
derive the contradiction.40
The investigation using ATPs also yielded other noteworthy results:
• it determined which axioms were otiose,
• it determined which properties of the modal operator were required
for the argument, and
• it determined that the argument, even as emended by Scott, implies
modal collapse, i.e., that φ ≡ φ, so that there can only be models of
the premises to the argument in which there is exactly one possible
world.
The modal collapse was already noted by Sobel41 but quickly confirmed
by the ATP. One might conclude, therefore that the premises of Go¨del’s
argument imply that everything is determined (we may even say: that
there is no free will).
Further variants of Go¨del’s argument, in which his premises were weak-
ened to address the above issues, were proposed by Anderson, Ha´jek, Fit-
ting, and Bjørdal.42 The modal collapse problem was the key motivation
for the contributions of Anderson, Ha´jek, and Bjørdal (and many others),
and these have also been investigated computationally.43 Moreover, ATPs
have even contributed44 to the clarification of an unsettled philosophical
dispute between Anderson and Ha´jek. In the course of this work, different
notions of quantification (actualist and possibilist) have been utilized and
combined within the SSE approach.45
39Benzmu¨ller, Sultana, Paulson & Theiß, “The higher-order prover LEO-II”.
40It is interesting to note here that during the course of its discovery of the inconsis-
tency, Leo-II engaged in blind-guessing. That is, it used a primitive substitution rule
to instantiate a predicate quantifier ∀Y with the λ-expression [λx x 6= x]. This is a
method that is not unification-based. See Andrews, “On connections and higher-order
logic”.
41Sobel, “Go¨del’s ontological proof”. Sobel, “Logic and Theism”.
42Anderson, “Some emendations of Go¨del’s ontological proof”. Anderson & Get-
tings, “Go¨del’s ontological proof revisited”. Ha´jek, “Magari and others on Go¨del’s
ontological proof”. Ha´jek, “Der Mathematiker und die Frage der Existenz Gottes”.
Ha´jek, “A new small emendation of Go¨del’s ontological proof”. Fitting, “Types,
Tableaus, and Go¨del’s God”. Bjørdal, “Understanding Go¨del’s ontological argument”.
43Benzmu¨ller & Paleo, “The modal collapse”.
44Benzmu¨ller, Weber & Paleo, “Analysis of the Anderson-Ha´jek controversy”.
45Benzmu¨ller & Paleo, “Higher-order modal logics”.
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2.2 Emendations by Anderson and Fitting
The emendations proposed by C. Anthony Anderson46 and Melvin Fit-
ting47 to avoid the modal collapse are rather distinctive and merit special
consideration. In order to rationally reconstruct Fitting’s argument, an
SSE of the richer logic underlying his argument was constructed. This
same SSE was used to reconstruct Anderson’s argument. By introducing
the mathematical notion of an ultrafilter, the two versions of the argu-
ment can be compared. This enhanced SSE technique shows that their
variations of the argument are closely related.
2.2.1 Anderson’s Variant.
Anderson’s central change was to modify a premise that governs the prim-
itive notion of a positive property, which was originally governed by the
axiom: Y is positive if and only if the negation of Y is non-positive (cf. ax-
iom A2 in Figure 2 where an exclusive or is utilized). Anderson suggests
that one direction of the biconditional should be preserved, namely, that:
A2′ If a property is positive, then its negation is not positive.
As expected, this has an effect on the argument’s validity, and in order
to render the argument logically valid again, Anderson proposes modifi-
cations to premises governing other notions of the argument — in partic-
ular, to those governing the definition of essence (which Anderson revises
to essence∗) and a modified notion of Godlikeness (Godlike∗):
essence∗ A property E is an essence∗ of an individual x if and only if
all of x’s necessary/essential properties are entailed by E and (con-
versely) all properties entailed by E are necessary/essential proper-
ties of x.
Godlike∗ An individual x is Godlike∗ if and only if all and only the nec-
essary/essential properties of x are positive, i.e., G∗x ≡ ∀Y (Y x ≡
P (Y )).
These two amended definitions render the argument logically valid again.
This was verified computationally.48 However, the validity comes at the
46Anderson, “Some emendations of Go¨del’s ontological proof”. Anderson & Get-
tings, “Go¨del’s ontological proof revisited”.
47Fitting, “Types, Tableaus, and Go¨del’s God”.
48Fuenmayor & Benzmu¨ller, “Types, Tableaus and Go¨del’s God in Isabelle/HOL”.
15 Computer Science and Metaphysics: Cross-Fertilization
cost of introducing some vagueness in the conception of Godlikeness, since
the new definition allows for there being distinct Godlike entities, which
differ only by properties that are neither positive nor non-positive.
2.2.2 Fitting’s Variant.
Fitting suggests that there is a subtle ambiguity in Go¨del’s argument,
namely, whether the notion of a positive property applies to extensions
or intensions of properties. In order to study the difference, Fitting for-
malizes Scott’s emendation in an intensional type theory that makes it
possible for him to encode and compare both alternatives. On Fitting’s
interpretation, the property of being Godlike would be represented by the
λ-expression [λx ∀Y (PY → Y x)], where P is the second-order property
of being a positive property. On Fitting’s understanding, the variable
Y in the λ-expression ranges over properties whose extensions are fixed
from world to world,49 while P is a second-order property whose exten-
sion among the first-order properties can vary from world to world. Thus,
the λ-expression that defines the being Godlike is a first-order property
whose extension varies from world to world.
In Go¨del’s original version of the argument, positiveness and essence
are second-order properties, but Fitting suggests that the expressions de-
noting the first-order properties to which positiveness and essence apply
are not rigid designators; such expressions might have different extensions
at different worlds. So in Fitting’s variant, positiveness and essence ap-
ply only to the extensions of first-order properties, where the expressions
denoting these extensions are rigid designators. If a property is positive
at a world w, its extension at every world is the same as its extension at
w. If we utilize the notion of a rigid property, that is, a property that is
exemplified by exactly the same individuals in all possible circumstances,
then we can say that, on Fitting’s understanding, only rigid properties
can be positive.
It should be noted that this technical notion of a positive property de-
parts from the ordinary notion; for example, a property like being honest
is something a person could have in one world but lack in another, and
in those worlds where he or she has that property, it would be considered
49Thus, the variable Y ranges over properties such that ∀x(Y x ≡ Y x). For example
one group of such properties can be defined in terms of an actuality operator: properties
of the form [λxAφ], i.e., being an x that is actually such that φ, satisfy the condition
just stated.
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‘positive’ in so far as it is contributory to a good moral character. But,
on the above conception, when a property like being honest is designated
a positive property, then for any actually honest individual x, an alter-
native world in which x is not honest would be inconceivable (i.e., we
take honesty to be an indispensable, identity-constitutive character trait
of x). In this sense, being self-identical is a prototypical positive property.
By restricting the notions in Go¨del’s argument in this way, Fitting thus
leaves Scott’s variant of Go¨del’s argument largely unchanged but is able
to prevent the modal collapse. This was confirmed computationally.50
2.3 Assessment and Comparison using Ultrafilters
These emendations proposed by Anderson and Fitting were further inves-
tigated and assessed computationally51 by extending the SSE approach in
the spirit of Fitting’s book. Experiments using Isabelle/HOL that inter-
actively call the model finder Nitpick confirm that the formula expressing
modal collapse is not valid. The ATPs were still able to find proofs for
the main theorem not only in S5 modal logic but even in the weaker and
less controversial logic KB.
In order to compare all the variant arguments by Scott, Anderson,
and Fitting, the notion of an ultrafilter was formalised in Isabelle/HOL.
On the technical level, two closely related definitions of ultrafilters were
provided: one (A) is defined on the powerset of individuals, i.e., on the
set of rigid properties, and the other one (A′) is defined on the power-
set of concepts, i.e., on the set of non-rigid, world-dependent properties.
Moreover, in these formalizations of the variants, a careful distinction was
made between the original notion of a positive property (P) that applies
to (intensional) properties and a restricted notion of a positive property
(P ′) that applies to the rigidified extensions of properties that would oth-
erwise count as positive. Using these definitions the following results were
proved computationally:
• In Scott’s variant both P and P ′ coincide, and both have the ultra-
filter properties A and A′.
• In Anderson’s variant P and P ′ do not coincide, and only P ′ con-
stitutes an A′ ultrafilter.
50Fuenmayor & Benzmu¨ller, “Types, Tableaus and Go¨del’s God in Isabelle/HOL”.
51Benzmu¨ller & Fuenmayor, “Can computers help to sharpen our understanding of
ontological arguments?”.
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• In Fitting’s variant, P is not considered an appropriate notion and
so not defined. However, P ′ is a A′ ultrafilter.
Our computational experiments thus reveal an intriguing correspondence
between the variants of the ontological argument by Anderson and Fit-
ting, which otherwise seem quite different. The variants of Anderson and
Fitting require that only the restricted notion of a positive property is an
ultrafilter.
2.4 Future Research
The above insights suggest an alternative approach to the argument,
namely, one that starts out with semantically introducing P or P ′ as
ultrafilters and then reconstructs variants of the formal argument on the
basis of this semantics. This could lead to an alternative reconstruction
in which some of the axioms of the variants described above could be
derived as theorems.
The experimental setup described above also provides a basis for in-
teresting research about how to prove that there is a unique object that
exemplifies the property being God. Go¨del’s original premise set guar-
antees that there is a unique such object, but at the pain of modal col-
lapse. The emendations prevent the modal collapse but at the loss of a
unique object that exemplifies being God. So it is important to study how
various notions of equality in the context of the various logical settings
described above might help one to restore uniqueness. One particular
motivation is to assess whether different notions of equality do or don’t
yield monotheism. Formal results about this issue would be of additional
interest theologically.
3 Implementation of Object Theory
Whereas the last section described the analysis of philosophical arguments
using plain SSEs without abstraction layers, the focus of this section is
the analysis of full philosophical theories by using SSEs with abstraction
layers. Section 1.2 already illustrated a simple example of this. We now
examine a more complicated case, namely, the analysis of AOT.
Though AOT has been developing and evolving since its first publica-
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tion,52 the basic idea, namely, of distinguishing a new mode of predication
and postulating a plenitude of abstract objects using the new mode of
predication, has remained constant. In all the publications on object the-
ory, we find a language containing the new mode of predication ‘x encodes
F ’ (‘xF ’), in which F is a 1-place predicate. This new mode extends the
traditional second-order modal predicate calculus, which is based on a sin-
gle mode of predication, namely, x1, . . . , xn exemplify F
n (‘Fnx1 . . . xn’).
The resulting language allows complex formulas built up from the two
modes of predication and the system allows the two modes to be com-
pletely independent of one another (neither xF → Fx nor Fx→ xF is a
theorem).
Using such a language (extended to include definite descriptions and
λ-expressions), the basic definitions and axioms of AOT have also re-
mained constant. If we start with a distinguished predicate E! to assert
concreteness, then the basic definitions and axioms of AOT are:
Definition: Being ordinary is (defined as) being possibly concrete:
O! = [λx ♦E!x]
Axiom: Ordinary objects necessarily fail to encode properties.
O!x→ ¬∃F (xF )
Definition: Being abstract is (defined as) not possibly being con-
crete.
A! = [λx ¬♦E!x]
Axiom: If an object possibly encodes a property it necessarily does.
♦xF → xF
Comprehension Schema for Abstract Objects: Where ϕ is any con-
dition on properties, there is an abstract object that encodes exactly
the properties such that ϕ, i.e., ∃x(A!x & ∀F (xF ≡ ϕ)), where ϕ
has no free occurrences of x.
In AOT, identity is not a primitive notion, and so the above definitions
and axioms are supplemented by a definition of identity for objects and a
definition of identity for properties, relations and propositions. The three
most important definitions are:
52Zalta, “Abstract Objects”.
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Objects x and y are identical if and only if either x and y are both
ordinary objects that necessarily exemplify the same properties or
x and y are both abstract objects that necessarily encode the same
properties.
Properties F and G are identical if and only if they are necessarily en-
coded by the same objects.
Propositions p and q are identical just in case the properties [λx p] and
[λx q] are identical.
While this basis has remained stable, other parts of the theory have been
developed and improved over the years. The most recent round of im-
provements, however, has been prompted by computational studies. Some
of these improvements have not yet been published. Nevertheless, we’ll
describe them here.
For example, in earlier versions of object theory, λ-expressions of the
form [λx1 . . . xn ϕ] in which ϕ contained encoding subformulas were sim-
ply not well-formed. That’s because certain well-known paradoxes of
encoding could arise for λ-expressions like [λx ∃F (xF & ¬Fx)].53 But
Kirchner’s computational studies54 showed that unless one is extremely
careful about the formation rules, such paradoxes could arise again by
constructing λ-expressions in which the matrix ϕ included descriptions
with embedded encoding formulas (encoding formulas embedded in de-
scriptions don’t count as subformulas, and thus were allowed). A natural
solution to avoid the re-emergence of paradox is to no longer assume that
all λ-expressions have a denotation. Given that AOT already included a
free logic to handle non-denoting descriptions, its free logic was extended
to cover λ-expressions. This allowed us to suppose that λ-expressions are
well-formed even if they include encoding subformulas; the paradoxical
ones simply don’t denote.
Other changes to object theory that have come about as a result of
computational studies include:
• the notion of encoding was extended to n-ary encoding formulas
and these allow one to define the logical notion of term existence
53An instance of Comprehension for Abstract Objects that asserted the existence of
an object that encodes just such a property would provably exemplify that property if
and only if it did not.
54Kirchner, “Representation and Partial Automation of the PLM in Isabelle/HOL”.
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directly by way of predication instead of by way of the notion of
identity,
• the comprehension principle for propositions has been extended to
cover all formulas of the language, so that even encoding formulas
denote propositions, and
• the application of AOT to the theory of possible worlds, in which the
latter are defined as abstract objects of a certain sort, was enhanced:
the fundamental theorem for possible worlds, which asserts that a
proposition is necessarily true if and only if it is true at all possible
worlds, was extended to cover the new encoding propositions.
These will be explained further below, as we show how AOT was first
implemented computationally and how this led to refinements both of the
theory and its implementation.
3.1 Construction of an SSE of AOT in Isabelle/HOL
The first SSE of AOT that introduced abstraction layers can be found in
Kirchner’s work.55 A detailed description of the structure of this SSE is
beyond the scope of this paper, however, we can nevertheless illustrate
some of its features and the challenges it had to overcome.
In order to construct an SSE, one has to represent the general model
structure of AOT in Isabelle/HOL. The most general models of AOT
are Aczel models,56 an enhanced version of which we now describe. Aczel
models consist of a domain of Urelements that is partitioned into ordinary
Urelements and special Urelements. The ordinary Urelements represent
AOT’s ordinary objects, whereas the special Urelements will act as prox-
ies for AOT’s abstract objects and determine which properties abstract
objects exemplify. In addition, a domain of semantic possible worlds (and
intensional states) is assumed, and propositions are represented either as
intensions (i.e., functions from possible worlds to Booleans) or more gen-
erally as hyperintensions (i.e., functions from intensional states to inten-
sions). This way the relations of AOT can be introduced before specifying
the full domain of AOT’s individuals: AOT’s relations can be modeled as
functions from Urelements to propositions (as the latter were just repre-
sented). Since this already fixes the domain of properties, a natural way
55Kirchner, “Representation and Partial Automation of the PLM in Isabelle/HOL”.
56Zalta, “Natural Numbers and Natural Cardinals as Abstract Objects”.
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to represent AOT’s abstract objects that validates their comprehension
principle is to model them as sets of properties (i.e., as sets of functions
from Urelements to propositions). The domain of AOT’s individuals can
now be represented by the union of the set of ordinary Urelements and
the set of sets of properties. In order to define truth conditions for ex-
emplification formulas involving abstract objects, a mapping σ that takes
abstract objects to special Urelements is required.57 With the help of this
proxy function σ, the truth conditions of AOT’s atomic formulas can be
defined as follows:
• The truth conditions of an exemplification formula Fnx1 . . . xn are
determined by the proposition obtained by applying the function
used to represent Fn to the Urelements corresponding to x1, . . . , xn
(in such a way that when xi is an abstract object, then its Urelement
is the proxy σ(xi)). This yields a proposition, which can then be
evaluated at a specific possible world (and in the hyperintensional
case, at the designated ‘actual’ intensional state).
• An encoding formula xF is true if and only if x is an abstract
object and the function representing F is contained in the set of
functions representing x. An ordinary object x does not encode
any properties, so all formulas of the form xF are false when x is
ordinary.58
In earlier formulations, AOT relied heavily on the notion of a propo-
sitional formula, namely, a formula free of encoding subformulas. This
notion played a role in relation comprehension: only propositional for-
mulas could be used to define new relations. However, we realized that
in the modal version of AOT, encoding formulas are either necessarily
true if true or necessarily false if false. This led to the realization that in
the models we had constructed, all formulas could be assigned a proposi-
tion as denotation; encoding formulas could denote propositions that are
necessarily equivalent to necessary truths or necessary falsehoods. As a
result, the latest (unpublished) versions of AOT have been reformulated
57Note that for the model to be well-founded, the function σ cannot be injective,
i.e., σ must map some distinct abstract objects to the same special Urelement.
58The truth conditions for n-ary encoding formulas x1 . . . xnFn can be defined on
the basis of monadic encoding formulas, but this requires an appeal to the semantics of
complex λ-expressions, discussed below. Hence we omit the discussion of this further
development here.
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without the notion of a propositional formula and one of the consequences
of this move is that comprehension for propositions can be extended to
all formulas (this will be discussed further in Section 3.3).
What remains to be defined are the denotations for AOT’s complex
terms, namely, definite descriptions and λ-predicates. Descriptions may
fail to denote and, since AOT follows Russell’s analysis of definite descrip-
tions, atomic formulas containing a non-denoting description are treated
as false. Therefore, the embedding has to distinguish between the domain
of individuals and the domain of individual terms. The latter domain con-
sists of the domain of individuals plus an additional designated element
that represents non-denoting terms. If there exists a unique assignment
to x for which it holds that ϕ, the definite description ıxϕ denotes this
unique object. If there is no unique such object, ıxϕ denotes the des-
ignated element in the domain of individual terms that represents non-
denoting terms. The truth conditions of atomic formulas can now just be
lifted to the new domain of terms, with the result that an atomic formula
involving the designated element for non-denoting terms becomes false.
In published versions of AOT, every well-formed λ-expression was as-
serted to have a denotation. However, AOT now allows λ-expressions
with encoding subformulas and requires that some of these (in particular,
the paradoxical ones) don’t denote. Only the λ-expressions that denote
are governed by β-Conversion. Nevertheless, every λ-expression has to be
interpreted in the model, and the mechanism for doing this is as follows,
where we simplify by discussing only the 1-place case and where we sup-
pose that an ordinary object serves as its own proxy. When the matrix ϕ
of the λ-expression [λxϕ] has the same truth conditions for all objects that
have the same proxy, one can find a function from Urelements to propo-
sitions that, when used to represent [λx ϕ], preserves β-Conversion.59
There is no such function when the matrix has different truth conditions
for objects with the same proxy, but these are precisely the matrices
for which the λ-expressions provably fail to denote. We interpret these
λ-expressions in a manner similar to the interpretation of non-denoting
descriptions, namely, by introducing an additional domain for relation
59For example, if we make use of the λ-expressions of HOL’s functional type theory,
then we could point to (λu.∃x. u = |x| ∧ ϕ′ x) as such a function, where (a) ϕ′ is a
function that represents the matrix ϕ of the AOT λ-expression [λx ϕ] and maps the
bound variable x to a proposition, (b) the type of the bound variable u is the type of
Urelements, and (c) |x| is the Urelement corresponding to x.
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terms that extends the domain of relations with a designated element for
non-denoting terms. Since the condition under which [λx ϕ] cannot de-
note is easy to formulate, namely as ∃x∃y(∀F (Fx ≡ Fy))∧¬(ϕ ≡ ϕyx),
such expressions can be mapped to this designated element.
Given the presence of non-denoting descriptions and λ-expressions,
AOT extended its free logic for descriptions to cover all complex terms.
Note that the axioms of free logic are usually stated in terms of a primitive
notion of identity or a primitive notion of existence (↓) for terms, so that,
for example, the axiom for instantiating terms into universal claims can
be stated as one of the following:
∀αϕ→ (∃β(β = τ)→ ϕτα)
∀αϕ→ (τ↓→ ϕτα)
Normally, these are equivalent formulations, since one usually defines τ↓
≡ ∃β(β = τ).
However, object theory now proves this standard definition as a theo-
rem! As we saw above, it doesn’t take identity as a primitive, but rather
defines it. Moreover, AOT does not take term existence as primitive ei-
ther, but defines it as well by cases: (a) an individual term κ exists (‘κ↓’)
just in case ∃F Fκ, provided F isn’t free in κ, and (b) an n-place property
term Π exists (‘Π↓’) just in case ∃x1 . . . ∃xn x1 . . . xnΠ, provided no xi is
free in Π, and (c) a 0-place proposition term Π exists (‘Π↓’) just in case
[λxΠ]↓, provided x isn’t free in Π. Thus, object theory reduces existence
to predication, and indeed, given its definitions of identity, reduces iden-
tity to predication and existence.60 Given the foregoing definitions, the
claim τ↓ ≡ ∃β(β = τ) becomes a theorem.
60To see how the latter comes about (i.e., the reduction of identity to predication and
existence), note that in a system like AOT, the definition of property identity stated
in the opening paragraphs of Section 3, have to be formalized using metavariables and
existence clauses in the definiens, so that we have:
Π=Π′ =df Π↓ & Π′↓ & ∀x(xΠ ≡ xΠ′)
The metavariables ensure that the definiendum Π = Π′ will be provably false when
either Π or Π′ is non-denoting. Otherwise one could argue, for non-denoting Π and
Π′, that both xΠ and xΠ′ are equivalent (since both are false, given that atomic
formulas with non-denoting terms are false), and since this holds for arbitrary x and
can be proved without an appeal to contingencies, it follows that ∀x(xΠ ≡ xΠ′). So
without the existence clauses, we could prove that Π = Π′ for any non-denoting terms
Π and Π′.
So whereas identity claims in AOT require the existence of the terms flanking the
identity sign, this is not required in computational implementations of other interest-
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3.2 Minimal models of second-order modal AOT
Normally, the minimal model for first-order quantified modal logic (QML)
contains one possible world and one individual, and in second-order QML,
there have to be at least two properties (one true of everything and one
false of everything). So, a natural question arises: what is the most nat-
ural axiom that forces the domain of possible worlds to have at least
two members (so as to exclude modal collapse), and what effect does
that have on the domain of properties? We’ve discovered that the ax-
iom Zalta has proposed for this job in AOT, namely, the assertion that
♦∃x(E!x&¬AE!x), not only forces the models to have at least 2 possible
worlds, but also a minimum of 4 propositions and (in combination with
the comprehension principle for abstract objects) a minimum of 16 prop-
erties. Proofs of these facts are available within the system. The latter
fact improved upon the original discussion in PLM, which had asserted
only that there are at least 6 different properties.61 But once properties
in AOT were modeled in Isabelle/HOL as functions from Urelements and
possible worlds to Booleans, it was recognized that there had to be at
least 16 of those functions.
The two core axioms that need to be considered for minimal models
of AOT are the modal axiom that requires the existence of a contingently
nonconcrete object already mentioned above and the comprehension ax-
iom of abstract objects:
♦∃x(E!x & ¬AE!x)
∃x(A!x & ∀F (xF ≡ ϕ))
where being abstract (A!) in the second axiom is defined as not possibly
being concrete, i.e., where A! = [λx ¬♦E!x]. In particular, the first of
these axioms implies:
∃x(♦E!x & ¬AE!x)
while the second implies:
∃x(¬♦E!x)
ing logics. For example, Scott introduces both a notion of “identity” and “existing
identity”, where the latter corresponds to AOT’s notion of identity. See Benzmu¨ller &
Scott, “Automating free logic in HOL”.
61Originally, Zalta had proved that E! and its negation, O!, A!, [λxE!x→ E!x] and
the latter’s negation, all of which exist by comprehension, were distinct properties.
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From these consequences it follows that there are at least two distinct
individuals; let’s call them x1 and x2.
62 The proof makes it clear that x1
is ordinary (i.e., O!x1 = [λz ♦E!z]x1) and x2 is abstract. But by the con-
struction of Aczel models, the proxy Urelement of the abstract individual
can’t be the ordinary individual. Urelements in Aczel models determine
the exemplification behaviour of individuals. So since x1 exemplifies be-
ing ordinary while x2 does not, x1 and x2 have to be mapped to distinct
Urelements. Furthermore, the first statement ∃x(♦E!x & ¬AE!x), im-
plies that there are at least two possible worlds in the Kripke semantics,
namely, a non-actual world, in which E!x1 holds, and the actual world,
in which E!x1 does not hold.
Recall that in our models, relations are represented as functions from
Urelements and possible worlds to Booleans.63 So, by a combinatorial
argument from the existence of two possible worlds and two Urelements,
we may derive the existence of at least (22)2 = 16 relations in the model;
each relation has a well-defined and distinct exemplification extension.
However, this doesn’t yet show, within the system, that there are at
least 16 distinct relations, but only that there are at least 16 distinct
relations in our models (we don’t assume a priori that our models are
complete). However, we found a proof of the existence of at least 16
relations in AOT and this is now part of PLM.64
62To see this, instantiate these two existential claims using two individual variables
x1 and x2, such that:
♦E!x1 & ¬AE!x1
¬♦E!x2
To show that x1 6= x2, we need the principle of the substitution of identicals, which is
asserted by the following axiom:
α = β → (ϕ→ ϕ′), whenever β is substitutable for α in ϕ, and ϕ′ is the result
of replacing zero or more free occurrences of α in ϕ with occurrences of β.
Now if, for reductio, x1 = x2, then ♦E!x1 → ♦E!x2, but since ¬♦E!x2, this cannot be
true, hence x1 6= x2. This already shows that there are at least two individuals AOT.
63In hyperintensional models, they additionally depend on an intensional state, but
since there is only one intensional state in a minimal model, this dependency can be
ignored; it doesn’t affect the size of the model.
64The modal axiom ∃x(♦E!x & ¬AE!x) of AOT requires the existence of a contin-
gently false proposition, namely ∃x(E!x & ¬AE!x). Call the false proposition q0 and
its negation q0. These propositions (in the form of propositional properties [λxq0] and
[λx q0]) were not considered when it was thought there were at least 6 properties. It
turns out that they are provably distinct from the six other properties mentioned above
and that combinations (e.g., conjunctions) of these propositional properties and the
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The foregoing discussion illustrates our research methodology: (1) we
constructed a model for the theory and conjectured that it was com-
plete; (2) we then analyzed the features of the model and arrived at
statements formulable within the systems AOT and its representation in
Isabelle/HOL that should be true given the model; (3) we investigated
whether these statements are indeed derivable in AOT (or alternatively,
derivable in the abstraction layer of the embedding); and (4) we then con-
cluded either that we had derived a new theorem within these systems or
that the model needed to be further refined.
3.3 An Extended Theory of Propositions and Worlds
One of the key challenges in constructing the first SSE of AOT was the
fact that its syntax relied heavily on the use of the notion of a proposi-
tional formula (i.e., formulas with no encoding subformulas). Only propo-
sitional formulas were allowed in the construction of n-place complex re-
lation terms for n ≥ 0. ϕ and [λ ϕ] were designated as 0-place relation
terms only if ϕ was a propositional formula. But capturing the notion of
a propositional formula in the SSE would have increased its complexity
significantly. For example, it would have been necessary to define two
versions of every connective and quantifier, one for non-propositional for-
mulas and one for propositional formulas. Instead, the SSE used one type
for both kinds of formulas, and thus one kind of connective and quantifier
suffices.
However, from this it became apparent that the models used for the
SSE assigned every formula a proposition, including those formulas that
contained encoding subformulas. This suggested that AOT could be ex-
panded similarly. Consequently, the comprehension principles for propo-
sitions in AOT were revised and expanded in such a way that it has
become a theorem that every formula denotes a proposition. And once
every formula denotes a proposition, the fundamental theorem of possi-
ble worlds becomes naturally extended to cover all formulas and not just
propositional ones. The fundamental theorem of possible world theory
asserts that for every proposition p and every world w, p ≡ w |= p,
where w |= p asserts that p is true in w (where this, in turn, is cashed out
as: w encodes the propositional property [λx p]). In previous versions of
six properties mentioned above in fact yield 16 properties that are provably distinct in
the system and correspond to the 16 properties in the models.
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AOT, only propositional formulas could be substituted for p, since only
propositional formulas denoted propositions. But once AOT was extended
(as a result of our computational investigations), every formula becomes
substitutable for p, including those with encoding subformulas.
4 Generalizing the Cross-Fertilization
As we see it, computer science and related disciplines like philosophy
that rely heavily on reasoning and argumentation, benefit from interdis-
ciplinary studies in which computational techniques are applied. Histor-
ically, the realization that first-order theorem provers don’t capture the
higher-order logic of many applied systems created the impetus for the de-
velopment of systems like Isabelle/HOL. In this paper, we’ve seen that the
requirements for implementing logics and metaphysical theories has led to
the development of new methodologies for creating automated reasoning
environments for complex systems (e.g., those that are essentially higher-
order, non-classical, or have complex terms). This is especially clear in
the development of additional abstraction layers in which deductive sys-
tems are recaptured so that only the theorems of the target system, and
no artifactual theorems, can be discovered computationally. Abstraction
layers in turn can be used as a technical tool to analyze properties of
the implementation, and in the case of AOT, the completeness of its em-
bedding. In our particular work, not only did the interdisciplinary effort
lead to improvements in the computational methodologies used for mod-
eling, but those same methodologies led to improvements in the target
metaphysical theory being implemented.
This cross-fertilization methodology can be depicted more generally
in Figure 1. In this diagram, the cross-fertilization occurs primarily be-
tween the various interactions that the user can have with the front-end
systems and applications. Note that Isabelle/HOL integrates state-of-the
art automated reasoning technology and benefits from the constant im-
provements in all the systems that it integrates. In the lower left corner
of Figure 1, the user is conducting/orchestrating experiments; in this par-
ticular case, the application in the lowest blue box is (the metaphysics of)
AOT. Since AOT is based on a higher-order modal logic, the computa-
tional mechanization of this “target logic” (in the middle blue box) has
served as a significant goal. However, at the start of the project, AOT’s
proof theory wasn’t computationally implemented generally. Therefore
D. Kirchner, C. Benzmu¨ller, and E. Zalta 28
(Counter-)Model  
Nitpick
Proof Automation 
Sledgehammer
        HOL-ATP 
Leo-II/III, Satallax
        FOL-ATP   
E, Spass, Vampire
                SMT-Solver 
CVC4, Z3
SAT-Solver 
(Counter-)Model  
Nunchaku
(Isabelle/HOL) 
HOL

—meta logic—

HO Modal Logic(s)

—target logic—

Metaphysics

—application—

models
embeds
unfolds
into
unfolds
into
Paradox 
Kodkod 
smbc
may-call-as-subsystem
interacts-with (thickness indicates intensity)
cross-fertilizes
Figure 1: Our general methodology supports the reuse of state of the art
theorem proving technology
the task was to semantically embed the language and theory in HOL
(the top blue box), which turned out to be sufficiently expressive as a
meta-logic for second-order AOT. A core advantage of this meta-logical
approach is that existing reasoning tools for HOL can readily be reused
for interactive and automated reasoning in the embedded target logic (the
black arrows). This is particularly helpful when the details of a desired
language and theory in a given context are not fully determined yet; the
methodology enables rapid prototyping of the different ways of formulat-
ing the language and axioms of the theory.
Our preferred proof assistant for HOL has been Isabelle/HOL. This
system comes with strong user-interaction support, including a config-
urable user-interface, which, in our context, enables readable surface pre-
sentations of the embedded target logic. Equally important is the au-
tomation provided by the proof assistants, which include both external
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ATPs orchestrated by the Sledgehammer tool65 and automated (counter-
)model finding tools like Nitpick66 and Nunchaku.67 These systems, in
turn, make calls to specialist tools such as Kodkod, Paradox, smbc, and
the SMT solvers CVC468 and Z3.69 Other systems integrated with Sledge-
hammer include the first-order ATPs E,70 Spass,71 Vampire,72 and the
higher-order ATPs Leo-II,73 Leo-III,74 and Satallax.75 If one downloads
Isabelle/HOL, all of these systems are bundled with it, except for the
higher order provers like Leo-II, Leo-III and Satallax, which can be ac-
cessed via the TPTP infrastructure using remote calls. These higher-
order ATPs internally collaborate in turn with first-order ATPs and SMT
solvers. And all these ATPs and SMT solvers internally rely on or inte-
grate state-of-the art SAT technology. Thus, whenever one of the sub-
systems improves, the enhancements filter up to the Isabelle/HOL envi-
ronment. In other words, a proof conjecture in some theory that is not
automatically solvable at the present time may well become solvable as
improvements to this framework accumulate.
When moving to other application domains (e.g., machine ethics),
deontic logics become relevant as target logics. The overall pictures stays
the same. Only the two lower blue boxes on the left of the Figure change.
Note that the combinations of different non-classical logics, e.g., those
required for the encoding of the Gewirth principle of generic consistency,76
can be realized and assessed as targets in this framework.
What has been described above is a generic approach to universal log-
ical and metalogical reasoning77 based on shallow semantic embeddings
in HOL. In addition, the approach also supports the direct encoding of
a target logic’s proof theory of choice. The shallow semantic embedding
technique and associated reasoning framework described in the previous
sections scale to applications in many other areas, including, for example,
65Blanchette, Bo¨hme & Paulson “Extending Sledgehammer with SMT solvers”.
66Blanchette & Nipkow, “Nitpick”.
67Cruanes & Blanchette, “Extending nunchaku to dependent type theory”.
68Deters, Reynolds, King, Barrett & Tinelli, “A tour of CVC4”.
69Moura & Bjørner, “Z3: An efficient smt solver”.
70Schulz, “System description: E”.
71Blanchette, Popescu, Wand & Weidenbach, “More SPASS with Isabelle”.
72Kova´cs & Voronkov, “First-Order Theorem Proving and Vampire”.
73Benzmu¨ller, Sultana, Paulson & Theiß, “The higher-order prover LEO-II”.
74Steen & Benzmu¨ller, “The higher-order prover Leo-III”.
75Brown, “Satallax”.
76Fuenmayor & Benzmu¨ller, “Alan Gewirth’s Proof”.
77Benzmu¨ller, “Universal (meta-)logical reasoning”.
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mathematical foundations, artificial intelligence and machine ethics. In
particular, metalogical investigations are feasible beyond what was con-
sidered possible before. In a case study in mathematics, for example,
Benzmu¨ller and Scott78 compared different axiom systems for category
theory proposed by MacLane,79 Scott,80 and Freyd & Scedrov.81 This
work started with an embedding of free logic in HOL, which was then
utilized to encode and assess the different axiom systems. As a side result
of the studies, a minor flaw in the work of Freyd and Scedrov was revealed
and corrected. Applications in artificial intelligence include the verifica-
tion of the dependency diagrams of systems in modal logic82 and an ele-
gant, higher-order encoding of common knowledge (of a group of agents)
as part of a solution for the wise men puzzle, a famous riddle in artificial
intelligence.83 A normative-reasoning workbench supporting empirical
studies with alternative deontic logics that are resistant to contrary-to-
duty paradoxes is currently being developed,84 and various embeddings of
other logics in this area can be found elsewhere.85 A recent extension and
application of this framework86 demonstrates that even ambitious ethical
theories such as Alan Gewirth’s principle of generic consistency can be
formally encoded and assessed on the computer.
References
J. Alama, P. E. Oppenheimer, and E. N. Zalta. Automating leibniz’s
theory of concepts. In A. P. Felty and A. Middeldorp, editors, Au-
tomated Deduction - CADE-25 - 25th International Conference on
Automated Deduction, Berlin, Germany, August 1-7, 2015, Proceed-
ings, volume 9195 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pp. 73–97.
Springer, 2015.
78Benzmu¨ller & Scott, “Automating free logic in HOL”. Benzmu¨ller & Scott, “Axiom
systems for category theory in free logic”.
79MacLane, “Groups, categories and duality”.
80Scott, “Identity and existence in intuitionistic logic”.
81Freyd & Scedrov, “Categories, Allegories”.
82Benzmu¨ller, Claus & Sultana, “Systematic verification of the modal logic cube”.
83Benzmu¨ller, “Universal (meta-)logical reasoning”.
84Benzmu¨ller, Parent & Torre, “A deontic logic reasoning infrastructure”.
85Benzmu¨ller, Farjami & Parent, “A dyadic deontic logic in HOL”. Benzmu¨ller,
Farjami & Parent, “Aqvist’s dyadic deontic logic E in HOL”. Farjami, Meder, Parent
& Benzmu¨ller, “I/O logic in HOL”.
86Fuenmayor & Benzmu¨ller, “Alan Gewirth’s Proof”.
31 Computer Science and Metaphysics: Cross-Fertilization
C. A. Anderson. Some emendations of Go¨del’s ontological proof. Faith
and Philosophy, 7(3):291–303, 1990.
C. A. Anderson and M. Gettings. Go¨del’s ontological proof revisited. In
Go¨del’96: Logical Foundations of Mathematics, Computer Science,
and Physics: Lecture Notes in Logic 6, pp. 167–172. Springer, 1996.
P. B. Andrews. On connections and higher-order logic. Journal of
Automated Reasoning, 5(3):257–291, 1989.
M. Bentert, C. Benzmu¨ller, D. Streit, and B. Woltzenlogel Paleo. Anal-
ysis of an ontological proof proposed by Leibniz. In C. Tandy, edi-
tor, Death and Anti-Death, Volume 14: Four Decades after Michael
Polanyi, Three Centuries after G.W. Leibniz. Ria University Press,
2016. Preprint URL:
http://christoph-benzmueller.de/papers/B16.pdf.
C. Benzmu¨ller. Universal (meta-)logical reasoning: Recent successes.
Science of Computer Programming, 172:48–62, March 2019. doi:
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.scico.2018.10.008.
C. Benzmu¨ller, M. Claus, and N. Sultana. Systematic verification of the
modal logic cube in Isabelle/HOL. In C. Kaliszyk and A. Paskevich,
editors, PxTP 2015, volume 186, pp. 27–41, Berlin, Germany, 2015.
EPTCS.
C. Benzmu¨ller, A. Farjami, and X. Parent. Aqvist’s dyadic deontic logic
E in HOL, 2018. MIREL 2018 workshop on MIning and REasoning
with Legal texts; available online at
http://orbilu.uni.lu/handle/10993/37014.
C. Benzmu¨ller, A. Farjami, and X. Parent. A dyadic deontic logic
in HOL. In J. Broersen, C. Condoravdi, S. Nair, and G. Pigozzi,
editors, Deontic Logic and Normative Systems — 14th International
Conference, DEON 2018, Utrecht, The Netherlands, 3-6 July, 2018,
pp. 33–50. College Publications, 2018. (John-Jules Meyer Best
Paper Award).
C. Benzmu¨ller and D. Fuenmayor. Can computers help to sharpen
our understanding of ontological arguments? In S. Gosh, R. Up-
palari, K. V. Rao, V. Agarwal, and S. Sharma, editors, Mathemat-
D. Kirchner, C. Benzmu¨ller, and E. Zalta 32
ics and Reality, Proceedings of the 11th All India Students’ Con-
ference on Science & Spiritual Quest (AISSQ), 6-7 October, 2018,
IIT Bhubaneswar, Bhubaneswar, India, pp. 195–226. The Bhak-
tivedanta Institute, Kolkata, 2018.
C. Benzmu¨ller, X. Parent, and L. van der Torre. A deontic logic rea-
soning infrastructure. In F. Manea, R. G. Miller, and D. Nowotka,
editors, 14th Conference on Computability in Europe, CiE 2018,
Kiel, Germany, July 30-August, 2018, Proceedings, volume 10936
of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pp. 60–69. Springer, 2018.
C. Benzmu¨ller and L. Paulson. Quantified multimodal logics in simple
type theory. Logica Universalis, 7(1):7–20, 2013.
C. Benzmu¨ller and D. S. Scott. Axiom systems for category theory in
free logic. Archive of Formal Proofs, May 2018. URL =
http://isa-afp.org/entries/AxiomaticCategoryTheory.html
C. Benzmu¨ller and D. S. Scott. Automating free logic in HOL, with an
experimental application in category theory. Journal of Automated
Reasoning, 2019. doi:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10817-018-09507-7.
C. Benzmu¨ller, N. Sultana, L. C. Paulson, and F. Theiß. The higher-
order prover LEO-II. Journal of Automated Reasoning, 55(4):389–
404, 2015.
C. Benzmu¨ller, L. Weber, and B. Woltzenlogel Paleo. Computer-assisted
analysis of the Anderson-Ha´jek controversy. Logica Universalis,
11(1):139–151, 2017.
C. Benzmu¨ller and B. Woltzenlogel Paleo. Automating Go¨del’s ontolog-
ical proof of God’s existence with higher-order automated theorem
provers. In T. Schaub, G. Friedrich, and B. O’Sullivan, editors,
ECAI 2014, volume 263 of Frontiers in Artificial Intelligence and
Applications, pp. 93–98. IOS Press, 2014.
C. Benzmu¨ller and B. Woltzenlogel Paleo. Higher-order modal logics:
Automation and applications. In A. Paschke and W. Faber, editors,
Reasoning Web 2015, Lecture Notes in Computer Science: 9203,
pp. 32–74, Berlin, Germany, 2015. Springer.
33 Computer Science and Metaphysics: Cross-Fertilization
C. Benzmu¨ller and B. Woltzenlogel Paleo. Interacting with modal log-
ics in the Coq proof assistant. In L. D. Beklemishev and D. V.
Musatov, editors, Computer Science — Theory and Applications —
10th International Computer Science Symposium in Russia, CSR
2015, Listvyanka, Russia, July 13-17, 2015, Proceedings, volume
9139 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pp. 398–411. Springer,
2015.
C. Benzmu¨ller and B. Woltzenlogel Paleo. An object-logic explanation
for the inconsistency in Go¨del’s ontological theory (extended ab-
stract, sister conferences). In M. Helmert and F. Wotawa, editors,
KI 2016: Advances in Artificial Intelligence, Proceedings, Lecture
Notes in Computer Science, pp. 244–250, Berlin, Germany, 2016.
Springer.
C. Benzmu¨ller and B. Woltzenlogel Paleo. The inconsistency in Go¨del’s
ontological argument: A success story for AI in metaphysics. In
S. Kambhampati, editor, IJCAI 2016, volume 1-3, pp. 936–942.
AAAI Press, 2016.
C. Benzmu¨ller and B. Woltzenlogel Paleo. The modal collapse as a
collapse of the modal square of opposition. In J.-Y. Be´ziau and
G. Basti, editors, The Square of Opposition: A Cornerstone of
Thought (Collection of papers related to the World Congress on the
Square of Opposition IV, Vatican, 2014), Studies in Universal Logic,
pp. 307–313. Springer International Publishing Switzerland, 2016.
http://www.springer.com/us/book/9783319450612.
Y. Bertot and P. Casteran. Interactive Theorem Proving and Program
Development – Coq’Art: The Calculus of Inductive Constructions.
Texts in Theoretical Computer Science. Springer, 2004.
F. Bjørdal. Understanding Go¨del’s ontological argument. In T. Childers,
editor, The Logica Yearbook 1998, pp. 214–217. Filosofia, 1999.
J. C. Blanchette, S. Bo¨hme, and L. C. Paulson. Extending Sledgeham-
mer with SMT solvers. Journal of Automated Reasoning, 51(1):109–
128, 2013.
J. C. Blanchette and T. Nipkow. Nitpick: A counterexample gener-
ator for higher-order logic based on a relational model finder. In
D. Kirchner, C. Benzmu¨ller, and E. Zalta 34
M. Kaufmann and L. C. Paulson, editors, Interactive Theorem Prov-
ing, First International Conference, ITP 2010, Edinburgh, UK, July
11-14, 2010. Proceedings, volume 6172 of Lecture Notes in Com-
puter Science, pp. 131–146. Springer, 2010.
J. C. Blanchette, A. Popescu, D. Wand, and C. Weidenbach. More
SPASS with Isabelle – Superposition with Hard Sorts and Con-
figurable Simplification. In L. Beringer and A. P. Felty, editors,
Interactive Theorem Proving — Third International Conference,
ITP F2012, Princeton, NJ, USA, August 13-15, 2012. Proceedings,
volume 7406 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pp. 345–360.
Springer, 2012.
C. E. Brown. Satallax: An automatic higher-order prover. In B. Gram-
lich, D. Miller, and U. Sattler, editors, Automated Reasoning —
6th International Joint Conference, IJCAR 2012, Manchester, UK,
June 26-29, 2012. Proceedings, volume 7364 of Lecture Notes in
Computer Science, pp. 111–117. Springer, 2012.
S. Cruanes and J. C. Blanchette. Extending nunchaku to dependent type
theory. In Proceedings First International Workshop on Hammers
for Type Theories, HaTT@IJCAR 2016, Coimbra, Portugal, July 1,
2016., volume 210 of EPTCS, pp. 3–12, 2016.
L. de Moura and N. Bjørner. Z3: An efficient smt solver. In C. R.
Ramakrishnan and J. Rehof, editors, Tools and Algorithms for the
Construction and Analysis of Systems, pp. 337–340, Berlin, Heidel-
berg, 2008. Springer Berlin Heidelberg.
M. Deters, A. Reynolds, T. King, C. W. Barrett, and C. Tinelli. A tour
of CVC4: How it works, and how to use it. In K. Claessen and
V. Kuncak, editors, Formal Methods in Computer-Aided Design,
FMCAD 2014, Lausanne, Switzerland, October 21-24, 2014, page 7.
IEEE, 2014.
A. Farjami, P. Meder, X. Parent, and C. Benzmu¨ller. I/O logic in HOL,
2018. MIREL 2018 workshop on MIning and REasoning with Legal
texts; available online, URL =
http://orbilu.uni.lu/handle/10993/37013.
B. Fitelson and E. N. Zalta. Steps toward a computational metaphysics.
Journal Philosophical Logic, 36(2):227–247, 2007.
35 Computer Science and Metaphysics: Cross-Fertilization
M. Fitting. Types, Tableaus, and Go¨del’s God. Kluwer, 2002.
P. Freyd and A. Scedrov. Categories, Allegories. North Holland, 1990.
D. Fuenmayor and C. Benzmu¨ller. Automating emendations of the
ontological argument in intensional higher-order modal logic. In
KI 2017: Advances in Artificial Intelligence 40th Annual German
Conference on AI, Dortmund, Germany, September 25-29, 2017,
Proceedings, volume 10505 of LNAI, pp. 114–127. Springer, 2017.
D. Fuenmayor and C. Benzmu¨ller. Types, Tableaus and Go¨del’s God
in Isabelle/HOL. Archive of Formal Proofs, 2017, https://www.
isa-afp.org/entries/Types_Tableaus_and_Goedels_God.html.
D. Fuenmayor and C. Benzmu¨ller. A case study on computational
hermeneutics: E. J. Lowe’s modal ontological argument. Journal of
Applied Logic - IfCoLoG Journal of Logics and their Applications
(special issue on Formal Approaches to the Ontological Argument),
5(7):1567–1603, 2018.
D. Fuenmayor and C. Benzmu¨ller. Formalisation and Evaluation of
Alan Gewirth’s Proof for the Principle of Generic Consistency in
Isabelle/HOL. Archive of Formal Proofs, Oct. 2018. http://
isa-afp.org/entries/GewirthPGCProof.html, Formal proof de-
velopment.
K. Go¨del. Appendix A. Notes in Kurt Go¨del’s Hand. In J. Sobel,
editor, Logic and Theism: Arguments for and Against Beliefs in
God, pp. 144–145. Cambridge University Press, 1970.
P. Ha´jek. Magari and others on Go¨del’s ontological proof. In A. Ursini
and P. Agliano, editors, Logic and algebra, page 125–135. Dekker,
New York etc., 1996.
P. Ha´jek. Der Mathematiker und die Frage der Existenz Gottes. In
B. Buldt et al., editor, Kurt Go¨del. Wahrheit und Beweisbarkeit,
pp. 325–336. o¨bv & hpt Verlagsgesellschaft mbH, Wien, 2001. ISBN
3-209-03835-X.
P. Ha´jek. A new small emendation of Go¨del’s ontological proof. Studia
Logica, 71(2):149–164, 2002.
D. Kirchner, C. Benzmu¨ller, and E. Zalta 36
B. Huffman and O. Kuncar. Lifting and transfer: A modular design
for quotients in Isabelle/HOL. In G. Gonthier and M. Norrish,
editors, Certified Programs and Proofs — Third International Con-
ference, CPP 2013, Melbourne, VIC, Australia, December 11-13,
2013, Proceedings, volume 8307 of Lecture Notes in Computer Sci-
ence, pp. 131–146. Springer, 2013.
D. Kirchner. Representation and Partial Automation of the Principia
Logico-Metaphysica in Isabelle/HOL. Archive of Formal Proofs,
Sept. 2017. http://isa-afp.org/entries/PLM.html.
L. Kova´cs and A. Voronkov. First-Order Theorem Proving and Vampire.
In N. Sharygina and H. Veith, editors, Computer Aided Verification
– 25th International Conference, CAV 2013, Saint Petersburg, Rus-
sia, July 13-19, 2013. Proceedings, volume 8044 of Lecture Notes in
Computer Science, pp. 1–35. Springer, 2013.
E. J. Lowe. A modal version of the ontological argument. In J. P. More-
land, K. A. Sweis, and C. V. Meister, editors, Debating Christian
Theism, chapter 4, pp. 61–71. Oxford University Press, 2013.
S. MacLane. Groups, categories and duality. Proceedings of the National
Academy of Sciences, 34(6):263–267, 1948.
T. Nipkow, L. C. Paulson, and M. Wenzel. Isabelle/HOL — A Proof
Assistant for Higher-Order Logic, volume 2283 of LNCS. Springer,
2002.
P. E. Oppenheimer and E. N. Zalta. On the logic of the ontological
argument. Philosophical Perspectives, 5:509–529, 1991.
P. Oppenheimer and E. Zalta. A computationally-discovered simplifica-
tion of the ontological argument. Australasian Journal of Philoso-
phy, 89(2):333–349, 2011.
P. E. Oppenheimer and E. N. Zalta. Relations Versus Functions at the
Foundations of Logic: Type-Theoretic Considerations. Journal of
Logic and Computation, 21(2):351–374, 2011.
F. J. Pelletier and E. Zalta. How to Say Goodbye to the Third Man.
Nouˆs, 34(2):165–202, 2000.
37 Computer Science and Metaphysics: Cross-Fertilization
S. Schulz. System description: E 1.8. In K. L. McMillan, A. Middeldorp,
and A. Voronkov, editors, Logic for Programming, Artificial Intel-
ligence, and Reasoning – 19th International Conference, LPAR-19,
Stellenbosch, South Africa, December 14-19, 2013. Proceedings,
volume 8312 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pp. 735–743.
Springer, 2013.
D. S. Scott. Appendix B: Notes in Dana Scott’s Hand. In J. Sobel,
editor, Logic and Theism: Arguments for and Against Beliefs in
God, pp. 145–146. Cambridge U. Press, 1972.
D. S. Scott. Identity and existence in intuitionistic logic. In M. Fourman,
C. Mulvey, and D. Scott, editors, Applications of Sheaves: Proceed-
ings of the Research Symposium on Applications of Sheaf Theory to
Logic, Algebra, and Analysis, Durham, July 9–21, 1977, volume 752
of Lecture Notes in Mathematics, pp. 660–696. Springer, 1979.
J. Sobel. Go¨del’s ontological proof. In J. J. Tomson, editor, On Being
and Saying. Essays for Richard Cartwright, pp. 241–261. MIT
Press, 1987.
J. Sobel. Logic and Theism: Arguments for and Against Beliefs in God.
Cambridge University Press, 2004.
A. Steen and C. Benzmu¨ller. The higher-order prover Leo-III. In
D. Galmiche, S. Schulz, and R. Sebastiani, editors, Automated Rea-
soning. IJCAR 2018, volume 10900 of Lecture Notes in Computer
Science, pp. 108–116. Springer, Cham, 2018.
E. Zalta. Abstract Objects: An Introduction to Axiomatic Metaphysics.
D. Reidel, 1983.
E. Zalta. Logical and analytic truths that are not necessary. The
Journal of Philosophy, 85(2):57–74, 1988.
E. Zalta. Twenty-Five Basic Theorems in Situation and World Theory.
Journal of Philosophical Logic, 22(4):385–428, 1993.
E. Zalta. Natural Numbers and Natural Cardinals as Abstract Objects:
A Partial Reconstruction of Frege’s Grundgesetze in Object Theory.
Journal of Philosophical Logic, 28(6):619–660, 1999.
D. Kirchner, C. Benzmu¨ller, and E. Zalta 38
Appendix: Go¨del’s Manuscript
Figure 2: Page 1 of Go¨del’s Manuscript. The axioms causing the incon-
sistency in Go¨del’s modal logic variant of the ontological argument for the
existence of God are highlighted (by us) in blue. (Unpublished works of
Kurt Go¨del are Copyright Institute for Advanced Study and are used with
permission. All rights reserved by Institute for Advanced Study.)
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Figure 3: Page 2 of Go¨del’s Manuscript. The axioms causing the incon-
sistency in Go¨del’s modal logic variant of the ontological argument for the
existence of God are highlighted (by us) in blue. (Unpublished works of
Kurt Go¨del are Copyright Institute for Advanced Study and are used with
permission. All rights reserved by Institute for Advanced Study.)
